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AN UPHILL BATTLE: FTC REGULATION OF
UNREASONABLE DATA SECURITY AS AN
UNFAIR PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION
We live in a society permeated by technology.1  Most households in
the United States have internet access, and a majority of Americans
regularly use two or more internet connected devices.2  In 2016, there
were over three billion internet users worldwide, and the number is
projected to surpass three and a half billion in 2017.3  The number of
connected devices increased from 8.7 billion in 2012 to 22.9 billion in
2016, and it is projected to increase to 50.1 billion by 2020.4  We spend
our days switching from device to device checking email, using social
media, shopping online, watching shows and movies, playing games,
and myriad other things that the internet and modern technology al-
low us to do.5  With every credit card purchase, every app download,
every new account set-up, people allow businesses to track, gather,
and use their information.6  This information can include names, ad-
dresses, social security numbers, dates of birth, credit card informa-
1. Giulia McHenry, Majority of Americans Use Multiple Internet-Connected Devices, Data
Shows, NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/
majority-americans-use-multiple-internet-connected-devices-data-shows.
2. Id.; see also Measuring America: A Digital Nation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 23, 2016),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2016/comm/digital_nation.pdf.
This statistic is based on the 2014 American Community Survey conducted by the Census Bu-
reau. Id.
3. Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/
#trend (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
4. Internet of Things (IoT): Number of Connected Devices Worldwide from 2012 to 2020 (in
Billions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/471264/iot-number-of-connected-devices-
worldwide/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
5. See How Smartphones Are Changing Consumers’ Daily Routines Around the Globe, NIEL-
SEN (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2014/how-smartphones-are-
changing-consumers-daily-routines-around-the-globe.html.
6. See 60 Minutes: The Data Brokers (NBC television broadcast Aug. 24, 2014), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/data-brokers-selling-personal-information-60-minutes/.  In many in-
stances, consumers are not even aware that their personal information is being gathered. See
RSA, CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS ON SECURITY: DO THEY STILL CARE? (2014), https://
www.emc.com/collateral/brochure/consumer-perceptions-on-security.pdf (“[O]nly about one-
third of consumers admit to actually reading the permissions requested by the apps they
download.”).
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tion, usernames and passwords, GPS location, and much more.7
Consumers can be proactive in safeguarding their personal informa-
tion;8 however, the extent to which they can do so is limited because
once consumers provide their personal information or allow it to be
gathered, what happens to that data is out of their hands.9  Consumers
cannot control how their information is stored, so they place a great
amount of trust in businesses and expect their information to be pro-
tected from unauthorized access.10
As waves of massive data breaches swept across American commer-
cial and financial sectors,11 people have become more concerned
about the privacy and security of their personal information.12  This
increased concern is well-founded, as companies of different sizes
across different industries continue to experience data breaches.13  A
few of the affected companies include JPMorgan Chase Bank, Ama-
zon, Aon Hewitt, Comcast, Home Depot, Target, Neiman Marcus, T-
Mobile, Sony, Hilton Worldwide, Uber, Trump Hotels, Costco, State
Farm, American Airlines, and United Airlines, but the list goes on
and on.14
Of course, not every data breach is preventable and not every
breach leads to identity theft or fraudulent charges;15 however, once
7. See Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management Revolution, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Oct. 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/10/big-data-the-management-revolution.
8. How to Keep Your Personal Information Secure, FTC (July 2012), https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0272-how-keep-your-personal-information-secure.
9. See generally 2 PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (Philip Leith ed., 2015).
10. See RSA, supra note 6 (“While many consumers are doing minimal to change their behav- R
ior, they still place value in their personal information and have high expectations among service
providers to secure their digital identities.”).
11. See FTC, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR JANUARY-DECEMBER 2014,
at 3–5, 12 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-net-
work-data-book-january-december-2014/sentinel-cy2014-1.pdf.
12. See TRAVELERS INDEM. CO., CONSUMER RISK INDEX: AN ANNUAL SURVEY OF THE RISKS
AMERICANS BELIEVE ARE MOST PREVALENT IN THEIR LIVES (2015), https://www.travelers.com/
iw-documents/resources/consumer-risk-index/2015-report.pdf.  According to a study performed
by the Travelers Insurance Company on consumer perception of different types of risks,
“[c]oncern over cyber, computer and tech-related risks rose sharply in 2015” with an increase
from 36% in 2014 to 57% in 2015. Id at 2.  The study further indicates that one in four people
“surveyed say they have been a victim of a data breach or cyber attack.” Id.
13. In this Comment, “data breach” refers to an incident when an unauthorized third party
gains remote access to sensitive electronic information.  This Comment does not address inci-
dents when data was inadvertently disclosed through error or negligence or when physical files
were copied or removed from company premises.
14. See IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., DATA BREACH REPORTS (2015), http://
www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/DataBreachReports_2015.pdf [hereinafter 2015 DATA
BREACH REPORT].
15. See Michael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litiga-
tion: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 170 (2008); see also Protecting
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personal information is obtained by an unauthorized party, there is
always the risk that identity theft or fraudulent charges may occur.  As
Chief Judge Wood reasoned in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group,
LLC,16 a class action suit arising out of hackers obtaining customer
credit card information, “Why else would hackers break into a store’s
database and steal consumers’ private information?  Presumably, the
purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or
assume those consumers’ identities.”17  Despite the fact that data
breaches affect millions of consumers, individuals have little legal or
economic recourse.
A patchwork of regulation has developed in response to the grow-
ing need for oversight of information security practices across differ-
ent industries.  Courts have granted relief only to consumers who can
quantify harm arising out of a data breach—generally due to identity
theft or fraudulent charges.18  Congress has reviewed numerous pro-
posed bills for regulation of information security on a national level.19
Almost all states passed data breach notification laws, which require
certain entities to disclose data breaches and notify affected consum-
ers.20  Administrative agencies have released industry specific regula-
tions, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule for the healthcare sector21 and the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) covering financial institutions,22
Our Nation’s Cyber Space: Educational Awareness for the Cyber Citizen: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Pol’y, Intergovernmental Relations & the Census, Comm. on Gov’t
Reform, 108th Cong. 5 (2004) (prepared statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-
commission-protecting-our-nations-cyberspace/042104cybersecuritytestimony.pdf [hereinafter
FTC Statement].
16. 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
17. Id. at 693.
18. See id. at 692 (“These plaintiffs must allege that the data breach inflicted concrete, particu-
larized injury on them.”).
19. See Current Legislation, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/ (select “Current Legis-
lation” next to search bar and search for “information security”) (last visited Mar. 13, 2017); see
also ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO CYBER-
SECURITY: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES, CURRENT LAWS, AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION (2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf.
20. See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Apr. 12, 2017), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notifi-
cation-laws.aspx (“Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Vir-
gin Islands have enacted legislation requiring private or governmental entities to notify
individuals of security breaches of information involving personally identifiable information.”).
21. See Covered Entities and Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/covered-entities/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2017); see
also GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34120, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND
DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 10 (2010), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL34120.pdf.
22. See STEVENS, supra note 21, at 17. R
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among others.  Within this patchwork, certain business entities are still
not subject to any regulation outside the state data breach notification
laws.  The need for more comprehensive regulation of information se-
curity grows while gaps in such a regulation still exist.23
In response to the growing need for oversight, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has taken on a dominant role in data security reg-
ulation of the business entities subject to its jurisdiction.24  The FTC
seeks to promote competition and protect consumers by “stopping un-
fair, deceptive or fraudulent practices in the marketplace.”25  The FTC
has the power to conduct investigations, enforce regulations through
administrative adjudication, and promulgate trade regulation rules
(TRRs).26  In the data security context, the FTC  considers inadequate
information security practices as unfair or deceptive practices prohib-
ited by the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).27  Between 2002
and 2016, the FTC successfully settled over sixty enforcement actions
against companies with inadequate information security.28  Consider-
ing the escalating number of new data breaches, pursuing individual
companies on a case-by-case basis is not an efficient means of effectu-
ating change in the marketplace.
The FTC proclaims its mission is to prevent substantial consumer
harm.29  In today’s landscape of recurrent data breaches, consumers
are harmed by unauthorized access to their personal and financial in-
formation.  This may be due to identity theft, fraudulent charges, or
paying for services to monitor for identity theft and fraudulent
charges.  The best way to protect consumers from harm caused by
data breaches is to reduce the occurrence of data breaches in the com-
23. Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission 1–2 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/sys
tem/files/documents/public_statements/630961/150318datasecurity.pdf. PREPARED STATE-
MENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION on Discussion Draft of H.R.__, Data
Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015 Before the COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND TRADE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. March 18, 2014
24. See David J. Bender, Tipping the Scales: Judicial Encouragement of a Legislative Answer
to FTC Authority over Corporate Data-Security Practices, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1665, 1674
(2013).
25. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 45(n), 57a (2012); About the FTC: What We Do, FTC, https://
www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
26. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 45(n), 57a; see also Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the
FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955, 997 (2016) (noting that although the FTC has
clear rulemaking authority, “the FTC consistently relies on adjudication over rulemaking”).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
28. FTC, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2016 4 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016/privacy_and_data_security_update_
2016_web.pdf [hereinafter DATA SECURITY UPDATE].
29. See About the Federal Trade Commission, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited
Mar. 5, 2016) [hereinafter About the FTC].
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mercial sector.  To safeguard against data breaches, companies must
be required to implement an information security program tailored to
protect that company’s electronically stores files.  Although what con-
stitutes a reasonable data security program is specific to each com-
pany, there are basic precautionary measures and general guidelines
that every company should follow to reduce the risk of data breaches.
The FTC has released numerous guides about suggested information
security practices for companies to consider, but no mandatory stan-
dard currently exists.
The FTC has been successful in its past enforcement actions in the
area of privacy and data security, but there are few such cases com-
pared to the number of companies that recently suffered data
breaches due to inadequate information security practices.  Critics
claim that the FTC has exceeded its authority under the FTCA,30 and
two companies have already challenged the FTC’s authority to regu-
late inadequate information security as an unfair practice.31  The FTC
has a long way to go before it can regulate commercial data security
on a level that will have a positive impact on the marketplace.  The
FTC’s inability to regulate unreasonable data security measures on a
larger scale significantly undermines its efforts to prevent substantial
consumer injury.  This Comment argues that the FTC should promul-
gate a TRR that articulates minimum information security standards.
The FTC has been reluctant to promulgate TRRs in fear that such
rules would become obsolete in the face of developing technology.32
Such fears prevent the FTC from regulating information security in
the commercial sector effectively and efficiently.
Part II of this Comment surveys the current landscape of data se-
curity and its regulation, including statistics concerning frequency and
scope of recent data breaches, legislative approaches to regulation of
data security, and the FTC’s evolving role in the data security con-
text.33  Part III of this Comment examines the challenges the FTC
faces in proving the elements of unfair or deceptive practices claim
under section 45(a) of the FTCA.34  This Part demonstrates how, ab-
30. See, e.g., Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Essay, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and
Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673,
691–93 (2013).
31. See Amanda R. Moncada, Comment: When a Data Breach Comes A-Knockin’, the FTC
Comes A-Blockin’: Extending the FTC’s Authority to Cover Data-Security Breaches, 64 DEPAUL
L. REV. 911, 921–24; see also infra notes 112–70 and accompanying text. R
32. See Hurwitz, supra note 26, at 154 (“It is unsurprising, then, that [areas defined by new or R
changing technologies] are the areas in which we see the FTC pushing aggressively to rely on
adjudication and characterizing its efforts as akin to ‘common law.’”).
33. See infra notes 36–170 and accompanying text. R
34. See infra notes 176–304 and accompanying text. R
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sent a TRR that expressly grants the FTC the authority to regulate
information security practices, the FTC lacks a streamlined manner of
enforcement, which significantly limits its ability to regulate informa-
tion security.  If an entity does not voluntarily settle, then the FTC
must prove every element of the “unfair” practice in each and every
case, as defined by the FTCA.  Part IV examines the impact of recent
federal and administrative decisions on the future enforcement ac-
tions, as well as the likely consequences if the FTC continues to rely
on case-by-case adjudication.35  Part V concludes by discussing the
likelihood of the FTC promulgating a TRR and the outlook of FTC’s
future enforcement actions.
II. BACKGROUND
The number of data breaches is continuously escalating.36  Despite
this prevalent threat, the United States does not have comprehensive
legislation to address this issue.37  Instead, Congress, state govern-
ments, and administrative agencies have created a “patchwork” of leg-
islation and regulations that cover certain entities, including
healthcare providers, financial institutions, and government agen-
cies.38  This piecemeal regulation, however, does not cover a signifi-
cant portion of business entities.  In light of this deficiency, the FTC
stepped up as the primary enforcer of data security in the business
sector.39  The FTC has been successful in its enforcement actions aris-
ing from inadequate information security; however, these cases ended
in settlement, and the FTC will face challenges to its authority,40 as it
has already in the cases of FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.41 and
LabMD, Inc. v. FTC.42
Section A provides statistics about of the number of occurrences
and types of data breaches that have occurred in the recent years.
Section B then explores the current state of information security regu-
lation.  Finally, Section C discusses the FTC’s evolving role in infor-
mation security regulation.
35. See infra notes 305–29 and accompanying text. R
36. See infra notes 43–54 and accompanying text. R
37. See infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. R
38. See infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. R
39. See Scott, supra note 15, at 128–29. R
40. DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28; see also Suevon Lee, D-Link Fires Back at FTC’s R
Lax Data Security Claims, LAW360 (Jan. 31, 2017, 9:04 P.M.), https://www.law360.com/articles/
887031/d-link-fires-back-at-ftc-s-lax-data-security-claims (discussing D-Link’s assertion that the
FTC overstepped its authority under section 5 of the FTCA).
41. 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
42. No. 16-16270-D, 2016 FTC LEXIS 123 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016), stay granted, LabMD, Inc. v.
FTC, No. 16-16270-D, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23559 (11th Cir. Nov. 10, 2016).
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A. Data Breach Statistics
Incidents of data breaches are increasing, and hackers have gained
access to hundreds of millions of consumer records.43  The Identity
Theft Resource Center (ITRC) collects statistics on the instances of
data breaches across various industries, including business, medical,
government, educational, and financial industries.44  The ITRC de-
fines a breach as “an incident in which an individual name plus Social
Security Number, driver’s license number, medical record or a finan-
cial record (credit/debit cards included) is potentially put at risk.”45
According to ITRC, the business sector suffered the largest number of
data breach incidents in 2016.46  A summary of ITRC’s findings from
2005 to 2016 is illustrated in Figure 1.47
43. FTC, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR JANUARY-DECEMBER 2015, at 4
(2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-
book-january-december-2015/160229csn-2015databook.pdf.
44. The ITRC provides free assistance to victims of fraud and identity theft and conducts
research and surveys to “[e]ducate consumers, corporations, government agencies, and other
organizations on best practices for fraud and identity theft detection, reduction and mitigation.”
Our Mission, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., http://www.idtheftcenter.org/About-ITRC/
about-us.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
45. 2015 DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 14. R
46. See IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., DATA BREACH REPORTS: 2016 END OF THE YEAR
REPORT (2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2016/DataBreachReport_2016.pdf
[hereinafter 2016 DATA BREACH REPORT]; see also IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., ITRC
BREACH STATISTICS 2005–2016 (2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2016/2005to
2016.pdf [hereinafter ITRC BREACH STATISTICS].
47. See ITRC BREACH STATISTICS, supra note 46. R
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FIGURE 1: DATA BREACH INCIDENTS BY CATEGORY
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In 2016, there were 1093 data breaches, which is a 40% increase
from 780 breaches in 2015.48  Businesses that experienced a data
breach in the past few years include Yahoo, Amazon, Hyatt Hotels,
Safeway, Kohl’s, Aon Hewitt, Comcast, Uber, T-Mobile, Trump Ho-
tels, Costco, State Farm, Esurance, Wendy’s, American Airlines, and
United Airlines, among many others.49  Statistics also show an in-
crease in data breaches due to hacking.50  The ITRC reported that
“[i]n 2015, Hacking incidents reached a nine-year high of 37.9 percent,
a jump of 8.4 percent over 2014 figures.”51 The number of hacking
48. See 2015 DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 14.  The ITRC also tracks the number of R
records released, but it is only an estimate as the actual number of released records is unknown.
See id. at 3.  The number of known compromised records is affected by the reporting require-
ments imposed upon entities which experienced a data breach. See generally Security Breach
Notification Laws, supra note 20.  Each state has its own requirements for disclosure and notifi- R
cation under the data breach notification laws, so the number of known records released varies
based on each state’s unique reporting requirements. Id. Additionally, the healthcare sector is
required to report data breach incidents under HIPAA and the FTC’s Health Data Breach Noti-
fication law. See FTC, FTC FACTS FOR BUSINESS: COMPLYING WITH THE FTC’S HEALTH
BREACH NOTIFICATION RULE (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language
/bus56-complying-ftcs-health-breach-notification-rule.pdf.
49. See 2015 DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 14; 2016 DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note R
46. R
50. See ITRC BREACH STATISTICS, supra note 46. R
51. See Identity Theft Resource Center Breach Report Hits Near Record High in 2015, IDEN-
TITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR. (Jan. 25, 2016) http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC-Surveys-Studies/
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incidents increased again in 2016, reaching 55.6% of all data breach
incidents.  Figure 2 illustrates the percentages of data breaches due to
different causes.52
FIGURE 2: DATA BREACH INCIDENTS BY TYPE
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According to Adam Levin, Chairman and Founder of IDT911, one
of the sponsors of IDRC that offers breach mitigation and identity
management services,
These numbers are by no means the whole story, as breaches have
become the third certainty in life . . . .  Many continue to fly under
the radar because many businesses aim to avoid the financial dislo-
cation, liability, and loss of goodwill that comes with disclosure and
notification . . . .  It is safe to assume that the actual number of
breaches is much higher than what is reported.53
2015databreaches.html [hereinafter Record High in 2015].  The ITRC uses seven categories to
classify data breaches: “Insider Theft, Hacking, Data on the Move, Subcontractor/Third Party,
Employee error/negligence, Accidental web/ Internet Exposure and Physical Theft.”  2015 DATA
BREACH REPORT, supra note 14, at 2. R
52. See ITRC BREACH STATISTICS, supra note 46. R
53. Record High in 2015, supra note 51; see also Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 30, at R
673–674 (“Most states require entities to notify affected individuals when certain personal infor-
mation is affected by a breach.”).
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Although not every data breach is preventable and not every data
breach results in identity theft,54 the frequency of data breaches is
alarming and further emphasizes the need to reform the current state
of information security regulation.
B. Current State of Data Security Regulation
Information security is regulated by a patchwork of laws and regu-
lations.  The judicial system, federal and state law, and various admin-
istrative agencies each offer limited regulation.
1. Judicial System
Consumers who brought civil suits against companies following data
breaches have seen limited success.55  The judicial system provides re-
course to individuals who can prove actual harm and establish stand-
ing under Article III of the Constitution.56  Those who suffered
identity theft or fraudulent charges that resulted in quantifiable mone-
tary losses can establish actual harm; however, the consumers whose
information was released in a data breach but who cannot show quan-
tifiable losses could not satisfy Article III standing.57  In Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA,58 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging
future harm from a defendant’s improper conduct must establish that
the harm is “certainly impending.”59  In Remijas v. Neiman Marcus
Group, LLC, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied this stan-
dard in the data breach context and overturned the district court’s
dismissal of the class action suit for lack of standing under Article
III.60  The Circuit Court held that “[a]llegations of future harm can
establish Article III standing if that harm is ‘certainly impending,’”
but the court did limit this threshold by including that “allegations of
possible future injury are not sufficient.”61  The Remijas holding gives
litigants in the Seventh Circuit a better chance to bring a claim; how-
54. See Scott, supra note 15, at 170; see also FTC Statement, supra note 15, at 5 (“Although a R
breach may indicate a problem with a company‘s security, breaches can happen . . . even when a
company has taken every reasonable precaution.”).
55. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690–92 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing
the requirements to meet standing under Article III of the Constitution).
56. Id. at 692 (“These plaintiffs must allege that the data breach inflicted concrete, particular-
ized injury on them.”); see also Scott, supra note 15, at 155 (“In the identity theft context, courts R
have embraced the general rule that an alleged increase in risk of future injury is not an ‘actual
or imminent injury.’” (quoting Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689 (S.D. Ohio 2006)).
57. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692, 696.
58. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
59. Id. at 1143.
60. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 697.
61. See id. at 692 (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147).
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ever, the case has not been decided on the merits, so it is still to be
determined whether individuals whose information was obtained in a
data breach can recover damages without suffering actual, quantifi-
able harm.62
2. State Laws
State laws similarly offer limited protection to consumers because
they focus on disclosure and remediation after a data breach has al-
ready occurred.63  Forty-eight states passed their own variation of a
data breach notification law, which requires certain entities to disclose
certain instances of data breaches and to timely notify those affected
by the breach.64  Notification following a data breach is important for
the mitigation process; however, it does not resolve the underlying
issue that a data breach has occurred.65
Requirements across states are not uniform, including the entities
that must report data breaches, the types of breaches that entities
must report, and the time frame to notify the affected consumers.66  In
the majority of states, after a data breach, a company must notify the
affected consumer “in the most expedient time possible and without
unreasonable delay.”67  In nine states, however, the statute provides a
definite time limit for notice (e.g., forty-five days).68
Until recently, all the states with a data breach notification law pro-
vided an exception for encrypted information.69  Tennessee was the
first state to amend the definition of a “breach of the security of the
system” requiring notice in cases of unauthorized access to encrypted
information.70  Additionally, fifteen states provide for a private cause
of action for violations of the breach notification statutes.71
62. See id. at 697.
63. See generally Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 20. R
64. See id.
65. See id.; see also Michael Keller, Holiday Shopping? How Much Do Data Breach Notifica-
tion Laws Protect?, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/
multimedia/2014/12/to-catch-a-breachhowmuchdodatabreachnotificationlawsprotect.html.
66. See Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 20. R
67. Stephen Embry, State Data Breach Notification Laws Just Got Crazier, ABA (May 2016)
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/youraba/2016/may-2016/state-data-breach-notification-
laws-just-got-crazier.html; see, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/10 (2014 & Supp. 2016).
68. Embry, supra note 67 (“Five states—Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and Wis- R
consin—have a 45-day period.”).
69. Id.; see, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/5 (2014 & Supp. 2016).
70. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (2016); Embry, supra note 67. R
71. Embry, supra note 67. R
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3. Federal Law
Congress reviewed dozens of proposed bills concerning broad over-
sight of privacy and data security, but has not yet passed any compre-
hensive laws.72  Instead, Congress passed legislation targeted at
particular industries and conferred authority on administrative agen-
cies to enforce the regulations.73  For example, the HIPAA Privacy
Rule establishes national standards to protect medical records and
other personal health information for covered entities, including
health care providers, health plans, health care clearinghouses, and
related entities.74  The GLBA requires financial institutions to protect
consumers’ private information from unauthorized access and to pro-
vide customers with notice of their privacy policies.75  The financial
sector must comply with the Safeguards Rule under the GLBA, which
requires financial institutions to ensure safety and confidentiality of
sensitive consumer information.76
There are numerous proposed bills currently before Congress that
seek to require business entities to implement an information security
program.77  A few of the proposed bills particularly charge the FTC
with implementing and administrating a framework to regulate data
security.78  For example, the Data Security Act of 2015 proposes to
“establish strong and uniform national data security and breach notifi-
cation standards for electronic data” and “to provide the Federal
Trade Commission with authority to enforce such standards.”79  The
Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2015 seeks to require certain en-
tities to comply with the listed safeguards and charges the FTC to en-
force compliance in addition to any “safeguards identified by the
Federal Trade Commission in a rulemaking process.”80  Under the
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015, the FTC would be
directed to “initiate a rulemaking proceeding to require each covered
entity [that collects or uses information about individuals] to carry out
72. See Current Legislation, supra note 19. R
73. See Covered Entities and Business Associates, supra note 21; see also STEVENS, supra note R
21, at 10. R
74. See Covered Entities and Business Associates, supra note 21. R
75. See also STEVENS, supra note 21, at 17. R
76. See FTC, SAFEGUARDING CUSTOMERS’ PERSONAL INFORMATION: A REQUIREMENT FOR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/
alt115-safeguarding-customers-personal-information-requirement-financial-institutions.pdf.
77. See, e.g., Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015, H.R. 1053, 114th Cong. (1st Sess.
2015); Data Security Act of 2015, H.R. 2205, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Consumer Privacy
Protection Act of 2015, S. 1158, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).
78. See, e.g., H.R. 1053; S. 1158.
79. H.R. 2205, § 2.
80. S 1158, at 17.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL403.txt unknown Seq: 13 21-SEP-17 7:51
2017] AN UPHILL BATTLE 1175
security measures to protect [personally identifiable information] it
collects and maintains.”81  The abundance of proposed bills regarding
information security regulation by the FTC demonstrates the legisla-
ture’s desire to prevent data breaches in the commercial sector, as op-
posed to notification and mitigation after a breach has already
occurred, and the FTC is in the best position to actively regulate infor-
mation security practices.
4. Administrative Agencies
Administrative agencies have focused on data security issues within
their respective jurisdictions, including the FTC, Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Federal Communications Commission
(SEC), the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).82
Prior to 2000, the commercial sector was essentially self-regulating
with respect to the level of security implemented to safeguard sensi-
tive information.83  Companies voluntarily promised to their custom-
ers a certain level of privacy and information security.84  The FTC first
began to intervene when companies failed to deliver on their own
promises and then expanded its scope of enforcement to include com-
panies that lacked sufficient information security measures.85
C. Evolution of Data Security Regulation by the FTC
To fill the void in the regulation of data security in the commercial
sector, the FTC has gradually begun to regulate inadequate data se-
curity as an unfair or deceptive practice under section 5 of the FTCA,
despite any official grant of such authority in the data security con-
text.86  The FTC has been successful in its administrative enforcement
actions, but it now faces resistance that it did not previously encoun-
81. H.R. 1053, at 16.
82. See Thad A. Davis et al., The Data Security Governance Conundrum: Practical Solutions
and Best Practices for the Boardroom and the C-Suite, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 613, 618
(2015).
83. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, FTC Comm’r, Success in Self-Regulation: Strategies to Bring
to the Mobile and Global Era, Address at the BBB Self-Regulation Conference 2–4 (June 24,
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410391/140624bbbself-regu
lation.pdf; see also Scott, supra note 15, at 130 (“By 2000, however, the Commission recognized R
that industry self-regulation was not working, and that ‘substantially greater incentives’ would be
required to protect consumer privacy online.”).
84. Ohlhausen, supra note 83, at 2–4. R
85. DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28. R
86. The FTCA does not expressly list what practices constitute as “unfair” or “deceptive,” but
rather provides a definition that can be applied to various practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)
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ter.87  Previous enforcement actions resulted in consent orders, which
are private settlements that require companies to abide by certain in-
formation security procedures and reporting requirements.88  As the
FTC expanded its regulatory scope and pursued companies for inade-
quate information security measures, two challengers refused to enter
a consent order and sought to cast doubt on the FTC’s authority.89
1. FTC Authority Under the FTCA
The FTC was created in 1914 under the FTCA with the original
purpose of preventing “unfair methods of competition in com-
merce.”90  Over time, the scope of the FTC’s authority has ex-
panded.91  Most significantly, in 1938, Congress amended the FTCA
to prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in addition to “un-
fair methods of competition” in order to enable the FTC to protect
consumers directly.92  Congress then passed the 1975 Magnuson-Moss
Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson-
Moss Act), which granted the FTC explicit authority to prescribe rules
to define specific acts as unfair or deceptive as well the requirements
to prevent such unfair or deceptive acts and practices.93  However, the
procedures to pass trade regulation rules became more complex after
the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of
1980.94  Then, in 1994, Congress restricted the FTC’s authority by ad-
ding section 45(n) and limiting the FTC’s discretion in declaring prac-
tices “unfair.”95
(2012).  Accordingly, the FTC does not have express authority to regulate inadequate informa-
tion security measures as an “unfair” practice. See id.
87. See Bender, supra note 24, at 1675 (“FTC’s enforcement of data-security policies under R
the unfairness prong of the FTC[A] has been met with substantial criticism.”).
88. See Scott, supra note 15, at 133, 143–44 (“Since all of the actions brought to date have R
quickly settled, no judicial opinions exist on the efficacy or legality of the Commission‘s actions
brought under the unfairness doctrine.”).
89. Moncada, supra note 31, at 921–24. R
90. About the FTC, supra note 29; see also The Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips- R
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
91. About the FTC, supra note 29. R
92. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012); see also About the FTC, supra note 29. R
93. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(2012)).
94. Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
For a detailed discussion of the difference in the rulemaking procedures, see generally Jeffrey S.
Lubbers, It’s Time to Remove the “Mossified” Procedures for FTC Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1979 (2015).
95. Federal Trade Commission Act Amendment of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9, 108 Stat.
1691, 1695 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012)).
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Congress also enacted legislation that charged the FTC with ad-
ministering various consumer protection laws,96 including the Truth in
Lending Act, CAN-SPAM Act, Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Telemarketing and Consumer
Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act.97
FTC has broad authority to regulate unfair and deceptive practices
under the FTCA.98  The FTC is “empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods
of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce.”99  To establish liability for un-
fair practices under section 45(a), the FTC must satisfy the three part
test under section 45(n) to determine whether a practice is “unfair.”100
Although the FTC is not explicitly granted the authority to regulate
information security, the FTC has interpreted inadequate security
measures to fall within the meaning of an unfair practice under sec-
tions 45(a) and (n).101
The FTC has the power to investigate “the organization, business,
conduct, practices, and management of any person, partnership, or
corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce.”102  Fol-
lowing an investigation, if the FTC has reason to believe there is a
violation, it can issue an administrative complaint.103  The FTC may
also bring suit in a district court to seek a permanent injunction and
other equitable relief for Defendants’ acts that violate section 45(a).104
96. About the FTC, supra note 29. R
97. DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28. R
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012); see also DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28. R
99. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
100. Id. § 45(n).  Section 45(n), titled “Standard of proof; public policy consideration,” pro-
vides as follows:
The Commission shall have no authority under this section or section 57a of this title to
declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair
unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act
or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evi-
dence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may
not serve as a primary basis for such determination.
Id.
101. Id. § 45(a), (n).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 46(a).
103. Id. § 45(b).
104. See id. § 53(b); see also First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief & Other Equita-
ble Relief ¶ 1, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. CV 12 1365 PHX PGR (D. Ariz. Aug. 9,
2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL403.txt unknown Seq: 16 21-SEP-17 7:51
1178 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1163
The alternative to administrative or judicial proceedings is to pass a
TRR that declares specific acts or practices as unfair, and violation of
the rule would constitute an unfair practice in violation of section
45(a)(1).105  The FTC has authority to promulgate TRRs under sec-
tion 57a(a).106  The Magnuson-Moss Act added this section to the
FTCA to provide clear statutory authority for the FTC to issue TRRs
dealing with unfair or deceptive practices.107  The FTC has not relied
on TRRs and instead focuses its efforts on adjudication.108
2. FTC Enforcement Actions in Data Security
The FTC has brought actions concerning a wide range of privacy
issues, including “over 130 spam and spyware cases and more than 40
general privacy lawsuits.”109  The FTC then expanded its focus and
pursued cases more specific to information security.110  Between 2002
and 2014, “the FTC has brought over 50 cases against companies that
have engaged in unfair or deceptive practices that put consumers’ per-
sonal data at unreasonable risk.”111  Although the FTC has been suc-
cessful in its enforcement actions so far, the FTC now faces resistance
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1).  The provision provides as follows:
[T]he Commission may prescribe—
(A) interpretive rules and general statements of policy with respect to unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning of section
45(a)(1) of this title), and
(B) rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning of section 45(a)(1) of
this title), except that the Commission shall not develop or promulgate any trade rule
or regulation with regard to the regulation of the development and utilization of the
standards and certification activities pursuant to this section. Rules under this subpara-
graph may include requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing such acts or
practices.
Id.
106. See id.; see also Stephanie W. Kanwit, Rulemaking in the Competition Area—Federal
Trade Commission power After the Magnuson-Moss Act, 1 FED. TRADE COMM’N § 5:7 (2015).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a); Kanwit, supra note 106, § 5:7; see also Stephanie W. Kanwit, R
Magnuson-Moss Rulemaking—Introduction, 1 FED. TRADE COMM’N § 6:3 (2015) (“The act gave
trade regulation rules an independent statutory basis which they had previously lacked, and also
prescribed sanctions for their violation, namely civil penalties aimed at deterrence, and con-
sumer redress.”).
108. See Hurwitz, supra note 26, at 997 (noting that although the FTC has clear rulemaking R
authority, “the FTC consistently relies on adjudication over rulemaking”); see also Lydia B.
Parnes & Carol J. Jennings, Through the Looking Glass: A Perspective on Regulatory Reform at
the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 989, 996 (1997) (“Designing industry-wide
solutions to problems proved difficult in some areas.  As a result, the paradigm shifted.
Rulemaking is generally undertaken by the Commission in response to congressional
directives.”).
109. DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28. R
110. Id.
111. Id.
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to its regulation of inadequate information security as an unfair
practice.
FTC’s regulation of data security as an unfair practice is relatively
new, and legal precedent is scarce.112  Recently, two companies de-
clined to settle FTC’s charges and challenged the FTC’s regulation of
information security procedures as an unfair practice.113
a. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.114
The first challenger, Wyndham Worldwide Corp. and three of its
subsidiaries (collectively referred to as “Wyndham”) challenged the
action filed in district court and claimed that the FTC lacked authority
to regulate data security as an unfair practice.115  Wyndham’s claims
were unsuccessful.116  In 2012, the FTC issued a complaint against
Wyndham in district court against Wyndham seeking permanent in-
junctive relief and other equitable relief for Wyndham’s violation of
section 45(a).117  The FTC alleged that Wyndham “violated both the
deception and unfairness prongs of section 5(a) ‘in connection with
Defendants’ failure to maintain reasonable and appropriate data se-
curity for consumers’ sensitive personal information.’”118  The FTC
alleged that Wyndham engaged in unfair cybersecurity practices that,
“taken together, unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed consumers’
personal data to unauthorized access and theft.”119
The charges stemmed from Wyndham’s failure to implement “read-
ily available security measures” to safeguard sensitive customer infor-
mation.120  Wyndham’s property management systems stored “names,
home addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, payment card
account numbers, expiration dates, and security codes” of the hotel
patrons.121  There were three hacking incidents in 2008 and 2009, none
112. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Pri-
vacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585 (2014) (“Despite over fifteen years of FTC enforcement,
there are hardly any judicial decisions to show for it.”).
113. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 799
F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015); In re LabMD Inc., No. 9357, 2015 FTC LEXIS 272 (F.T.C. Nov. 13,
2015), vacated, No. 9357, 2016 FTC LEXIS 128 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016), judgment entered by No.
9357, 2016 FTC LEXIS 123 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016), stay granted, LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, No. 16-
16270-D, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23559 (11th Cir. Nov. 10, 2016); see also Moncada, supra note
31, at 921–24. R
114. 799 F.3d 236.
115. Id. at 240.
116. Id. at 240–42.
117. See Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 607.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 608.
120. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 241.
121. Id. at 240.
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of which Wyndham addressed with any changes or improvements in
the hotel’s data security protocols.122  In all three incidents, hackers
gained access to Wyndham’s computer systems and collectively “stole
personal and financial information for hundreds of thousands of con-
sumers leading to over $10.6 million dollars in fraudulent charges.”123
During the first breach, in April 2008, hackers gained access to
Wyndham’s national network through a local network in an Arizona
hotel.124  Hackers then repeatedly guessed user names and passwords
until they successfully logged into an administrator account that led to
unencrypted information on over 500,000 accounts.125  The second
breach, in March 2009, also occurred as a result of hackers gaining
access to the administrative account to steal unencrypted payment
card information from more than 50,000 customers.126  Wyndham dis-
covered malware placed from the previous attack that gave hackers
access to Wyndham’s systems for approximately two months.127  The
last breach occurred later in 2009, when hackers used the same means
to steal payment card information from over 69,000 customers.128
Wyndham was not alerted about this breach until 2010 when a credit
card company received complaints of fraudulent charges from its
customers.129
Among several deficiencies noted by the FTC, Wyndham allegedly
stored payment card information in plain text, failed to employ mea-
sures to prevent access to its systems by unauthorized third parties,
and did not follow proper response procedures after a hacking inci-
dent.130  Wyndham did not utilize encryption or firewalls and allowed
the use of very basic and easily ascertainable administrator creden-
tials.131  Even after the breach, Wyndham did not review its systems
for weaknesses or implement safeguards to prevent future attacks,
and such disregard resulted in two additional breaches within the
same year.132  Despite these shortcomings in security, Wyndham chose
not to settle the charges and challenged the FTC’s authority to regu-
late data security practices.133
122. Id. at 241.
123. Id. at 240–41.
124. Id. at 241.
125. Id. at 242.
126. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 242.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 240–42.
131. Id. at 241.
132. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 241.
133. Id. at 236, 240–42.
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Although most FTC enforcement actions settle prior to any signifi-
cant litigation,134 Wyndham moved to dismiss the complaint.135  In its
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Wyndham presented three main ar-
guments: (1) the FTC lacked authority to bring charges for unfair
practices related to data security; (2) the FTC did not issue formal
trade regulations; and (3) the FTC “allegations are pleaded insuffi-
ciently to support either an unfairness or deception claim.”136  The
district court denied Wyndham’s motion to dismiss, but granted inter-
locutory appeal and certified two questions of controlling law to the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals: (1) whether the FTC can bring an
unfairness claim under section 45(a) involving inadequate data secur-
ity; and (2) whether the FTC must promulgate TRRs before bringing
an unfairness claim under section 45(a).137  The Third Circuit Court
affirmed that “unfair” acts can include inadequate data security prac-
tices.138  Wyndham eventually settled FTC’s charges and entered a
consent order.139
Although Wyndham settled, the case yielded the first binding deci-
sion in the appellate court affirming the FTC’s authority to regulate
inadequate information security as an unfair practice.140  Shortly after
Wyndham, another company chose to adjudicate and challenged the
FTC on the merits of their allegations.
b. In re LabMD, Inc.141
The second company, LabMD, Inc. (LabMD), challenged the mer-
its of the administrative complaint and argued the FTC failed to prove
that LabMD’s allegedly inadequate data security constituted an unfair
134. See Scott, supra note 15, at 143–44. R
135. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 242.
136. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014).
137. Id. at 636.
138. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 240.
139. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It Unfairly Placed
Consumers’ Payment Card Information at Risk (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-placed-consumers-payment.
140. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 112, at 585; see also Scott, supra note 15, at 143-44; R
Thomas O’Toole & Katie W. Johnson, FTC’s Unfairness Authority Upheld in Wyndham Data
Security Litigation, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.bna.com/ftcs-unfairness-au
thority-n17179889558/.  This case also demonstrates the interplay between the FTC’s actions al-
leging deception and unfairness because facts that support the claim of deception also support
the claim of unfairness. See infra notes 220–33 and accompanying text. R
141. No. 9357, 2015 FTC LEXIS 272 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015), vacated, No. 9357, 2016 FTC
LEXIS 128 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016), judgment entered by No. 9357, 2016 FTC LEXIS 123 (F.T.C.
July 28, 2016), stay granted, LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, No. 16-16270-D, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23559
(11th Cir. Nov. 10, 2016).
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practice within the meaning of the FTCA.142  The Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) agreed and dismissed the complaint for failure to estab-
lish that LabMD’s conduct resulted in actual or likely harm to con-
sumers as required by section 45(n).143  The ALJ’s dismissal of the
FTC complaint yielded the first successful challenge to the FTC’s alle-
gations of inadequate data security based on the merits of the case.144
The FTC commissioners then issued an opinion reversing the ALJ’s
decision and concluding that LabMD’s data security practices consti-
tuted an unfair act or practice within the meaning of section 5 of the
FTCA.145  The order is currently stayed pending LabMD’s appeal.146
The FTC has not faced such adamant opposition in the past.147  This
case identified weaknesses in the FTC’s claim, which is premised
solely on unfairness and not deception.148
On August 28, 2013, the FTC initiated an administrative action
against LabMD, a medical testing laboratory.149  The complaint al-
leged LabMD’s failure to employ “reasonable and appropriate” mea-
sures to prevent unauthorized access to consumer’s personal
information “‘caused or is likely to cause’ substantial consumer in-
jury.”150  The FTC pointed to two LabMD “security incidents” that
resulted from inadequate information security.151
The first incident occurred in May 2008 when Triversa Holding
Company (Triversa), a “data security company that offers breach de-
tection and remediation services”152 informed LabMD that it found
LabMD’s insurance aging report on LimeWire, a peer-to-peer file-
sharing network which allowed one computer user to access the files
shared by another computer user through the same file-sharing appli-
cation.153  The report contained 1718 pages of personal patient infor-
mation, including names, social security numbers, and medical records
of approximately 9300 of LabMD’s patients (referred to as the “1718
File”).154  The insurance aging report was shared through LimeWire,
142. In re LabMD Inc., 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *5–6.
143. Id. at *200–01.
144. Id. at *1.
145. In re LabMD, Inc., 2016 FTC LEXIS 128, at *1–2.
146. LabMD, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23559, at *1–2.
147. See Bender, supra note 24, at 1675 (“FTC‘s enforcement of data-security policies under R
the unfairness prong of the FTC Act has been met with substantial criticism.”).
148. In re LabMD Inc., 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *1.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at *2.
152. Id. at *2, *53.
153. Id. at *124–25.
154. In re LabMD Inc., 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *3.
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which was installed on the computer used for billing.155  Triversa of-
fered its services to LabMD by representing that LabMD’s file had
spread across the file sharing network and offered its services to miti-
gate the damage. 156  LabMD investigated the incident, but refused to
hire Triversa.157
The second incident occurred in October 2012 when the Sacra-
mento California Police Department (SPD) found documents associ-
ated with LabMD when they searched a house as part of investigation
into utility bill fraud.158  The officers found forty “Day Sheets” con-
taining names and social security numbers of approximately 600 con-
sumers as well as copies of nine checks made payable to LabMD
(collectively referred to as “Sacramento Documents”).159  The Day
Sheets are generated through LabMD’s billing software.160  There also
were documents containing social security numbers that were used by
different people.161  The individuals in possession of the documents
“subsequently pleaded ‘no contest’ to identity theft charges.”162
The ALJ dismissed the complaint holding that the FTC did not
meet its burden of proof to show that LabMD’s “failure to employ
reasonable data security constitutes an unfair trade practice” under
the FTCA.163  Specifically, the FTC failed to satisfy the first prong of
the three-part test set out in section 45(n) of the FTCA,164 which lim-
its unfair trade practices to conduct that “causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers.”165  Regarding the first incident, the
ALJ found insufficient evidence to conclude that the brief exposure of
the 1718 File resulted in any substantial harm.166  Regarding the Sac-
ramento documents, the ALJ held that there was an insufficient causal
connection between the documents and LabMD’s failure to reasona-
bly safeguard information contained in its electronic files.167  In partic-
ular, the ALJ pointed to the lack of evidence showing the Sacramento
Documents were obtained from LabMD’s system.168  Considering the
155. Id. at *50.
156. Id. at *62.
157. Id. at *52–53.
158. Id. at *152.
159. Id.
160. In re LabMD Inc., 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *157.
161. Id. at *3.
162. Id. at *108–09.
163. Id. at *25–26.
164. Id. at *26.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
166. In re LabMD Inc., 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *26.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *26–27.
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totality of the presented evidence, the ALJ concluded that the FTC
failed to establish substantial consumer injury and dismissed the com-
plaint.169  The FTC promptly filed a Notice of Appeal to have the
FTC commissioners review the decision.170
The FTC commissioners reversed the ALJ’s decision, concluding
that “the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard for unfairness” and
that “LabMD’s security practices were unreasonable, lacking even ba-
sic precautions to protect the sensitive consumer information main-
tained on its computer system.”171  The FTC issued a final order
requiring LabMD to implement certain compliance measures, includ-
ing a comprehensive information security system.172  LabMD ap-
pealed the Final Order and sought a stay pending review.173  The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted the stay, holding that
LabMD made a sufficient showing that it is likely to succeed on the
merits and that it will be irreparably injured absent a stay.174  The
Eleventh Circuit Court reasoned that “it is not clear that a reasonable
interpretation of § 45(n) includes intangible harms like those that the
FTC found in this case” and that “it is not clear that the FTC reasona-
bly interpreted ‘likely to cause’ as that term is used in § 45(n).”175  The
appeal remains to be decided on the merits.
The FTC expended considerable time and resources to prove that a
company’s inadequate information security program constitutes an
unfair practice under the FTCA.  As this is still a relatively novel is-
sue, the FTC is likely to face greater resistance in future enforcement
actions.  Moving forward, case-by-case adjudication is not a practical
manner of enforcement.
III. ANALYSIS
Despite the efforts of the judicial, legislative, and administrative
bodies, effective information security regulation is still lacking for cer-
tain business entities.176  Although data breaches are not always pre-
169. Id. at *200–01.
170. Jessica Corso, FTC Appeals Unfavorable LabMD Data Breach Decision, LAW360 (Nov.
25, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/731601/ftc-appeals-unfavorable-labmd-data-breach-
decision.
171. In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 FTC LEXIS 128, at *1 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016).
172. In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 FTC LEXIS 123, at *1–2 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016).
173. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, No. 16-16270-D, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23559, at *6 (11th Cir.
Nov. 10, 2016).
174. Id. at *6–7.
175. Id. at *9–10.
176. See generally Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in United States: Overview, in DATA PROTEC-
TION GLOBAL GUIDE, Westlaw (database updated July. 1, 2016), http://us.practicallaw.com/6-
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ventable and may occur even with adequate information security
measures, certain basic safety measures should be employed by all en-
tities to substantially reduce the risk of a data breach.  FTC’s strategy
to use case-by-case adjudication cannot produce the kind of industry-
wide effect necessary to substantially reduce the risk of data
breaches.177  The FTC should issue a TRR that declares a covered
entity’s failure to implement a reasonable data security program as an
unfair practice within the meaning of section 45(n) and prescribes
methods that may be implemented by the covered entity as part of a
reasonable information security program, which should be tailored to
each entity based on the type of data it stores. It is important to note
that a data breach in itself is not a per se violation of section 45(a).178
Instead, a violation occurs when a company fails to implement reason-
able security, and such security deficiencies lead to a data breach.179
If company employed reasonable information security, but still exper-
ienced a data breach, then, there is no violation of section 45.  A TRR
would function in the same manner.
In the fifteen years that the FTC commenced actions arising out of
inadequate information security, most of the respondents elected to
settle.180  The two companies who challenged the FTC’s claims are the
first, but they certainly will not be the last.  Resistance to the Commis-
sion’s regulation of data security is still in the early stages.181  The
FTC cannot effectively regulate data security if it has to establish the
elements of an unfair practice under the FTCA in each and every
502-0467 (noting that data breaches continue to plague industries across the United States, even
with judicial, legislative, and administrative regulations attempting prevent them).
177. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 112, at 585 (“Despite over fifteen years of FTC en- R
forcement, there are hardly any judicial decisions to show for it.”); see also Scott, supra note 15, R
at 143–44 (“Since all of the actions brought to date have quickly settled, no judicial opinions
exist on the efficacy or legality of the Commission’s actions brought under the unfairness
doctrine.”).
178. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 626 (D.N.J. 2014) (conclud-
ing that “[t]he FTC therefore does more than simply assert ‘that a violation . . . must have
occurred simply because the data loss incident occurred.’  It alleges insufficiencies that, drawing
reasonable inferences in favor of the FTC, led to data-security breaches.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Willey v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57826, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July
7, 2009))); see also FTC Statement, supra note 15, at 5 (“Although a breach may indicate a prob- R
lem with a company’s security, breaches can happen . . . even when a company has taken every
reasonable precaution. In such instances, the breach will not violate the laws that the FTC
enforces.”).
179. Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 626.
180. See DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28. R
181. See Bender, supra note 24, at 1675; Deborah Gersh et al., LabMD and FTC’s Attempt to R
Expand Data Security Authority, LAW360 (Aug. 3, 3016, 5:13 PM), https://www.law360.com/arti
cles/824067/labmd-and-ftc-s-attempt-to-expand-data-security-authority (providing the timeline
for the LabMD case and the  FTC’s attempt to expand its authority).
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case.  The difficulty of establishing the necessary elements makes the
outcome of cases uncertain, and individual, fact-intensive proceedings
are time consuming.  Although the FTC gained much needed judicial
affirmation of its authority to regulate data security under the unfair-
ness prong in Wyndham, the holding in that case is limited to the
Third Circuit and the court merely confirms the FTC’s authority to
find certain inadequacies in information security as unfair practices.182
The court reviewed neither the merits of the allegations nor the stan-
dards on which the FTC relies.183  While case-by-case adjudication has
worked in the past, moving forward, a TRR would allow the FTC to
regulate information security practices much more effectively and effi-
ciently.  Section A examines the FTC’s power to promulgate TRRs,184
as compared to the FTC’s power to adjudicate and enter into consent
orders, as discussed in Section B.185  Section C analyzes the challenges
to FTC’s authority to regulate inadequate information security as an
unfair practice under section 45(a) of the FTCA.186  Finally, Section D
discusses the difficulties in establishing each element of the test to de-
termine whether a practice is unfair under section 45(n).187
A. Trade Regulation Rules
The FTC has the power to promulgate TRRs in addition to enforc-
ing regulations through administrative adjudication.188  The
Magnuson-Moss Act granted the FTC explicit authority to prescribe
rules to define specific acts as unfair or deceptive.189  However, the
procedures to pass trade regulation rules became more complex after
the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of
1980.190  There are sixteen TRRs currently in effect, which are codi-
fied in 16 C.F.R., subchapter D.191  Due to the complicated and exten-
sive procedures, no new rulemaking has been initiated since 1980.192
182. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 259 (3d Cir. 2015).
183. See id. at 236, 252–57.
184. See supra notes 188–97 and accompanying text. R
185. See supra notes 197–232 and accompanying text. R
186. See supra notes 233–61 and accompanying text. R
187. See supra notes 261–305 and accompanying text. R
188. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 45(n), 57a (2012); see also Hurwitz, supra note 26 (noting that R
although the FTC has clear rulemaking authority, “the FTC consistently relies on adjudication
over rulemaking”).
189. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(2012)).
190. Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
For a detailed discussion of the rulemaking procedures, see generally Lubbers, supra note 94. R
191. 16 C.F.R., subch. D (2016).
192. Lubbers, supra note 94, at 1989. R
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In the area of information security, the benefits of a TRR outweigh
the cumbersome process required to promulgate it.193  In the long run,
a TRR will be much more effective to regulate data security than a
series of administrative proceedings and consent orders.  If the FTC
passes a TRR that requires certain minimum information security
measures, each covered entity will be explicitly required to informa-
tion security program that is reasonable for its particular circum-
stances because and failure to comply would be a violation of the
TRR and constitute an unfair practice in violation of section
45(a)(1).194  This TRR would eliminate the respondent’s ability to
challenge to FTC’s authority to regulate inadequate data security as
an unfair practice.195  The TRR would also eliminate FTC’s burden to
establish all the elements of an unfair practice in each individual pro-
ceeding.196  The issue will not be whether the FTC has authority to
regulate inadequate data security as an unfair practice, but rather
whether a company’s information security program is adequate and
reasonable.  The FTC could then better allocate its resources to en-
force of the TRR and pursue a larger number of noncompliant enti-
ties.  Given the rising rate of data breach instances in the business
sector, pursuing approximately a dozen companies per year as the
FTC has done is not efficient and will not bring about market wide
change that is necessary to safeguard consumers against unauthorized
access to their personal and financial information due to lacking or
inadequate data security measures.
B. Administrative Proceedings
A series of administrative actions and consent orders is not an effi-
cient way to effectuate change in the industry.  Administrative pro-
ceedings yield one of two results: (1) the respondent elects to settle
and enters a consent order delineating the required corrective ac-
tion;197 or (2) the respondent challenges the charges and goes through
the drawn out administrative proceedings.198
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a; see also Lubbers, supra note 94, at 1982. R
194. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a.
195. See, e.g., supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. R
196. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a.
197. See, e.g., DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28. R
198. See, e.g., Moncada, supra note 31, at 921–24. R
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1. Consent Orders
If the respondent elects to settle the charges brought by the FTC,
the resulting settlement is referred to as a consent order.199  Consent
orders are voluntary settlements between the FTC and the respondent
that typically last twenty years and prescribe corrective action as well
as compliance and reporting standards that the respondent must abide
by during the twenty year period.200  The scope of the consent order
varies in each case and is narrowly tailored to the circumstances in
each case.
The benefits to respondents to avoid an administrative proceeding
create a strong incentive to settle despite the long time commitment
and extensive compliance standards.  Administrative adjudication is
time-consuming, costly, and unlikely to result in a favorable verdict
for the respondent because the reviewing court grants considerable
deference to the FTC.201  Additionally, when a respondent enters into
a consent order, the respondent does not admit liability, which is at-
tractive to companies seeking to salvage its reputation.202
The FTC has been successful in settling its enforcement actions in
data security partly because many of the cases involved claims of a
deceptive practice pursuant to section 45(a),203 which is easier for the
FTC to establish than a claim of an unfair practice because deceptive
practices are not subject to the requirements of section 45(n) that sets
forth a three-part test to determine whether a practice is unfair.204
The Commission can bring a claim for a deceptive practice when a
199. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 112, at 607 (“Technically, consent orders legally func- R
tion as contracts rather than as binding precedent.”).
200. See Bender, supra note 24, at 1675 (“Generally, these consent orders require the compa- R
nies to submit periodic independent audit results and other reports indicating compliance with
the Commission‘s data-security standards.”).
201. Although LabMD prevailed in the initial administrative action, before the FTC commis-
sioners overturned the ALJ’s decision, the financial burden and negative publicity were too
great, and the company went out of business during the drawn out proceedings. See Dune Law-
rence, A Leak Wounded This Company. Fighting the Feds Finished It Off: Michael Daughtery
Learns the High Price of Resistance, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 25, 2016), https://
www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-labmd-ftc-tiversa/.  Perhaps, companies that chose to settle
did so to avoid a similar fate.
202. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 112, at 610 (“One of the main motivations for settling R
with the FTC is that it allows the company to avoid admitting wrongdoing in exchange for reme-
dial measures.”).
203. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), (n); see also G.S. Hans, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and
FTC Enforcement: Broadening Unfairness Regulation for a New Era, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 163, 171 (2012) (“Deception remains the most commonly used prong of the
FTC[A].  This is likely because of its relative clarity compared to unfairness—it is easier to iden-
tify a discrete example of a deceptive practice that misleads consumers than one that is unfair to
consumers.”).
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company announces its own standard for information security and
fails to deliver on that standard.205  Consumers rely on the company’s
promise that it will safeguard their personal information, and some-
times even choose one company over another because of that prom-
ise.  Under the FTCA, a company deceives the customers when it
promises certain security but does not implement measures to provide
the security it promises.206
In many cases, the FTC initiated a claim of deception after a com-
pany suffered a data breach that exposed consumer personal and fi-
nancial information.207  A data breach itself is not a per se violation of
section 45(a), but failing to implement promised security measures
can constitute as a deceptive practice because the company deceived
the public by not actually proving the security services it promised.208
In many instances, a data breach serves as an alert that the company
may not have adequate information security measures.  Data breaches
can occur even when a company utilized reasonable security mea-
sures; however, promising certain security to consumers and not pro-
viding that security is a deceptive practice that is prohibited by section
45(a).209  In such cases, it was in the respondent’s interest to settle and
comply with the consent order than risk challenging the allegations
because the respondents have a low chance of prevailing.
The result of the FTC’s enforcement practice is a collection of vol-
untary settlements rather than adjudicated cases.210  The consent or-
ders offer no binding legal precedent for the FTC to rely on in future
enforcement actions.211  The FTC urges companies to look to these
consent orders for guidance as to what constitutes reasonable security
205. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a); see, e.g., FTC v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding
that in order to establish liability for deceptive practices under section 45(a), the FTC must
show: “(1) there was a representation; (2) the representation was likely to mislead customers
acting reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) the representation was material”).
206. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in
Googles Rollout of its Buzz Social Network (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2011/03/ftc-charges-deceptive-privacy-practices-googles-rollout-its-buzz [hereinaf-
ter FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices]; see also DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28. R
For example, Fandango, LLC settled charges that it “misrepresented the security of its mobile
app and failed to secure the transmission of millions of consumers’ sensitive personal informa-
tion from its mobile app.” Id.
207. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 112, at 630. R
208. Id.; see also In re LabMD Inc., No. 9357, 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *114 (F.T.C. Nov. 13,
2015).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a); see also FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices, supra note 206. R
210. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 112, at 585 (“Despite over fifteen years of FTC en- R
forcement, there are hardly any judicial decisions to show for it.”).
211. See id. at 607 (“Technically, consent orders legally function as contracts rather than as
binding precedent.”).
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practices; however, this guidance does not have the force of law.212
Several commentators view the FTC’s prior enforcement actions and
consent orders as a form of privacy common law that serves as a foun-
dation for a regulatory scheme.213  Other commentators question
whether the FTC’s “common law” consisting of consent orders satis-
fies the constitutionally required fair notice and resembles common
law in other legal contexts.214  In Wyndham, the Third Circuit Court
reasoned that the previous enforcement action and consent decrees
provide fair notice that the FTC may regulate unreasonable data se-
curity as an unfair practice,215 but it does not go as far as to say the
previous enforcement actions and consent orders provide notice of the
specific requirements for reasonable data security.216  The Third Cir-
cuit Court later commented, in dicta, “the consent orders, which admit
no liability and which focus on prospective requirements on the defen-
dant, were of little use to it in trying to understand the specific re-
quirements imposed by § 45(a).”217  The court applied the same
reasoning to the guidebooks with suggested information security prac-
tices issued by FTC.218  No other court has determined how much
weight to give the consent orders and guidebooks, so it is possible that
other courts may disagree with the reasoning of the Third Circuit.
Absent a TRR, the FTC faces potential challenges not only to its au-
thority under the FTCA, but also to its reliance on the collection of
consent orders and guidebooks as a basis for reasonable information
security standards.219
212. See Bender, supra note 24, at 1675. R
213. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 112, at 590; see also Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell R
Bartnick, Another Round in the Chamber: FTC Data Security Requirements and the Fair Notice
Doctrine, 17 J. INTERNET L. 1, 18 (2013).
214. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 30, at 674–75. R
215. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 257 (3d Cir. 2015).
216. See id. at 257 n.22.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 256 n.21 (noting that “the guidebook could not, on its own, provide ‘ascertaina-
ble certainty’ of the FTC’s interpretation of what specific cybersecurity practices fail § 45(n)”).
219. Recently, the Commission issued three major publications: (1) the “2014 Privacy and
Data Security Update,” which provides an overview all of its recent enforcement actions; (2)
“Start with Security: A Guide for Business,” which lists ten important lessons from the Commis-
sion’s past enforcement actions; and (3) the “Information Compromise and the Risk of Identity
Theft: Guidance for Your Business,” which discusses best practices to securely handle informa-
tion. DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28; see FTC, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR R
BUSINESS (2005), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwith-
security.pdf; see also FTC FACTS FOR BUSINESS, INFORMATION COMPROMISE AND THE RISK OF
IDENTITY THEFT: GUIDANCE FOR YOUR BUSINESS (2015), http://www.consumer.sc.gov/Docu
ments/IDTU/ID%20Theft/ftc_information_compromise.pdf.
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2. Administrative Claims Shift from Deceptive to Unfair Practices
When the respondent elects not to settle, the FTC bears a high bur-
den of proof to establish the relevant elements in each and every case,
which is very fact intensive and often involves long, drawn out pro-
ceedings.220  As the FTC asserts authority over inadequate informa-
tion security as an unfair practice without a simultaneous claim of
deceptive practices, it will meet greater resistance than it did in the
past with claims for deceptive practices because the standard to estab-
lish an unfair practice is more specific and the respondent has a great
chance of success.
FTC’s cases against Wyndham and LabMD reveal the weaknesses
in FTC’s regulation of inadequate information security as an unfair
practice and demonstrate that it is impractical to continue the course
of administrative proceedings in lieu of promulgating a TRR.  Ini-
tially, the FTC started bringing charges for inadequate information
security as a deceptive practice, but then the FTC gradually started
bringing charges for both unfair and deceptive practices.221  Unlike
FTC’s authority to regulate deceptive practices, FTC’s power to de-
clare practices unfair is limited by section 45(n).222  In its suit against
Wyndham, the FTC claimed that “Wyndham has published a privacy
policy on its website that overstates the company’s cybersecurity”223
and that “Wyndham engaged in unfair cybersecurity practices that,
‘taken together, unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed consumers’
personal data to unauthorized access and theft.”224  Although the
standards to prove deception and unfairness are different, the Third
Circuit Court in Wyndham recognized that “analysis of unfairness en-
compasses some facts relevant to the FTC’s deceptive practices claim”
and as such, “facts relevant to unfairness and deception claims fre-
quently overlap.”225  Although Wyndham moved to dismiss both the
unfair and the deceptive practices claims, the questions certified for
interlocutory review only concerned the unfair practices claim.226
220. FTC’s General Counsel “portrays the unfairness power not as a flexible tool, but as a
fuzzy and indistinct doctrine. As he observes, the language of the FTC[A] was intentionally
vague in order to allow judicial decisions to further clarify and shape the meanings of deception
and unfairness.”  Hans, supra note 204, at 173. R
221. See DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28. R
222. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), (n) (2012).
223. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 241.
224. Id. at 240.
225. Id. at 245.
226. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 631 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 799
F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
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The FTC may not have enough to establish that inadequate infor-
mation security as an unfair practice without facts that typically exist
in cases involving deceptive practices.  The complaint against LabMD
contained allegations of inadequate information security as an unfair
practice, but no claims of deceptive practices.227  The ALJ dismissed
the complaint for failure to show that LabMD’s data security proce-
dures fell within the scope of unfair practices as set forth by section
45(n).228  LabMD’s success in dismissing the complaint was bitter-
sweet because the drawn out proceedings drove the company out of
business.229  The victory was brief, as the FTC commissioners over-
turned the ALJ’s dismissal and entered judgment against LabMD.230
LabMD appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit granted a stay pending
LabMD’s appeal.231  If there was a TRR, the data security require-
ments and FTC’s authority to enforce them would be more clearly
articulated, which would eliminate the kind of needlessly long pro-
ceedings that occurred in the LabMD case.232  Similar challenges to
FTC’s authority are likely to arise as more companies experience data
breaches.
C. Challenges of FTC’s Unfairness Authority
The FTC had a successful record of settling its enforcement actions
with voluntarily consent orders.  Wyndham, however, was not willing
to settle like the rest did.  Instead, Wyndham claimed that the FTC did
not have authority to regulate inadequate data security as an unfair
practice.  This challenge led to Third Circuit Court affirming FTC’s
jurisdiction over inadequate data security practices under the FTCA.
Although other circuit courts may arrive at a different conclusion, for
now, the FTC received much needed affirmation of its regulatory
authority.
Wyndham moved to dismiss the FTC complaint for on two grounds
relating to FTC’s authority under the FTCA: (1) the FTC lacked “au-
thority to assert an unfairness claim in the data security context” and
(2) the FTC did not “formally promulgate regulations before bringing
its unfairness claim.”233  The threshold issue of authority over unfair
227. See supra notes 142–52 and accompanying text. R
228. See supra notes 163–70 and accompanying text. R
229. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. R
230. No. 9357, 2016 FTC LEXIS 128 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016), judgment entered by No. 9357,
2016 FTC LEXIS 123 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016).
231. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, No. 16-16270-D, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23559 (11th Cir. Nov. 10,
2016).
232. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 45(n), 57a.
233. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014).
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practices in the data context was not adjudicated prior to the Wynd-
ham case.  As a result, the New Jersey District Court certified an or-
der for interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit Court to get guidance
on the FTC’s authority to regulate inadequate data security as an un-
fair practice.234  Absent a TRR, FTC’s authority to regulate informa-
tion security practices is unclear.  The Third Circuit Court reviewed
two main issues: “whether the FTC has authority to regulate cyber-
security under the unfairness prong of § 45(a); and, if so, whether
Wyndham had fair notice its specific cybersecurity practices could fall
short of that provision.”235
On the issue of data security regulation under the unfairness prong
of section 45(a), the Third Circuit Court did not find Wyndham’s argu-
ments persuasive.236  The court issued the first judicial opinion on the
scope of FTC’s authority under the unfairness prong, which is a signif-
icant victory for the FTC because it provided binding precedent, even
if it only limited to the Third Circuit.  If a company in another circuit
similarly challenges the FTC’s charges, another court may come to
opposite different conclusion, especially if that company had certain
data security measures in place, but a breach still occurred.  On the
second issue, the Third Circuit Court held the FTC did provide suffi-
cient notice that a company could be liable for unfair data security
practices under the statute.237  To remove any uncertainty and pro-
longed future litigation, the FTC should promulgate a TRR concern-
ing a reasonable minimum standard for information security
procedures and foreclose any potential challenges to its authority.
1. Unfairness Claim in the Data Security Context
Wyndham attempted to refute the FTC’s charges by focusing on the
definition of an unfair practice under the FTCA.  The FTCA defines
an unfair practice using a multi-factor test, which leaves enough flexi-
bility for the FTC to consider a range of different practices as unfair,
but it also creates the possibility for a respondent to argue that a cer-
234. Id. at 636.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), interlocutory appellate review is appropriate
when the following three criteria are satisfied:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling ques-
tion of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
Id. at 633.
235. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
236. See supra notes 113–42 and accompanying text. R
237. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 257.
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tain practice is not unfair if the FTC fails to establish one of the ele-
ments of the definition.
On appeal, Wyndham claimed for the first time that requirements
of section 45(n) are “necessary but insufficient conditions of an unfair
practice and that the plain meaning of the word ‘unfair’ imposes inde-
pendent requirements that are not met.”238  The Third Circuit Court
did acknowledge that section 45(n) “may not identify all of the re-
quirements for an unfairness claim” because “it does not answer
whether these are the only requirements for a finding of unfair-
ness.”239  The court found the additional requirements proposed by
Wyndham inapplicable, and concluded that Wyndham’s conduct did
not fall outside the scope of the plain meaning of unfair.240  This inter-
pretation would also be inconsistent with the legislative intent to
maintain a limited, yet flexible standard for defining unfair prac-
tices.241  As the court noted, it is doubtful whether a court would im-
pose additional requirements for a practice to constitute as unfair
considering the limiting function of section 45(n).242  While such inter-
pretation is doubtful, it is not impossible, and a different court may
come to such a conclusion if the defendant crafts a better argument
based on more favorable facts.
Wyndham then argued that “even if cybersecurity were covered by
§ 45(a) as initially enacted, three legislative acts since the subsection
was amended in 1938 have reshaped the provision’s meaning to ex-
clude cybersecurity.”243  The Circuit Court did not agree and reasoned
that the legislative intervention was only to ease the procedural bur-
den of declaring an act or practice unfair.244  To the contrary, these
legislative acts “expand[ ] the scope of the FTC’s authority” beyond
the FTCA, rather than define its scope and limitations.245  Again, a
TRR would foreclose this argument by expressly granting authority to
the FTC.
Finally, Wyndham argued that “FTC’s interpretation of § 45(a) is
‘inconsistent with its repeated efforts to obtain from Congress the
very authority it purports to wield here.’”246  Again, the Third Circuit
Court disagreed, demonstrating that the FTC’s call for Congressional
238. Id. at 244.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 247.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 247.
244. Id. at 248.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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intervention refers to policies to protect consumers beyond the scope
of section 45(a).247  If the FTC promulgates TRRs, respondents would
not be able to raise issues of FTC’s authority in future enforcement
actions, so the FTC can instead use its resources to prove that compa-
nies have insufficient data security rather than wasting resources to
establish that it can even bring such charges in the first place.248
2. Fair Notice in the Data Security Context
Another issue a company may raise in an effort to dismiss the
FTC’s claims is that the company lacked fair notice that inadequate
data security is an unfair practice.  Imposing liability under a statute
or regulation violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution
“if the statute or regulation . . . ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that
it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’”249
Absent a TRR, there is no express grant of authority to the FTC to
regulate data security practices and no official source that describes
the required information security measures, other than the sugges-
tions contained in the guidebooks periodically issued by the FTC.
Wyndham argued that “the FTC failed to give fair notice of the
specific cybersecurity standards the company was required to fol-
low.”250  Specifically, “Wyndham argue[d] it was entitled to ‘ascertain-
able certainty’ of the FTC’s interpretation of what specific
cybersecurity practices are required by § 45(a).”251  The Third Circuit
Court held that the previous enforcement actions and consent decrees
provide sufficient notice that a company could be liable for unfair data
security practices under the statute.252  The court pointed to Wynd-
ham’s own contention that there is no FTC rule that merits deference,
so the court is to interpret the meaning of the FTCA, which calls for
an “ordinary judicial interpretation of a civil statute, and the ascer-
tainable certainty standard does not apply.”253  Thus, the court ascer-
tained, “The relevant question is not whether Wyndham had fair
notice of the FTC’s interpretation of the statute, but whether Wynd-
ham had fair notice of what the statute itself requires.”254  This issue
247. Id. at 248–49.
248. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012).
249. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 249 (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307,
2317 (2012)).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 252.
252. Id. at 257.
253. Id. at 253.
254. Id. at 253–54.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL403.txt unknown Seq: 34 21-SEP-17 7:51
1196 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1163
then becomes an as-applied challenge, which is a weak claim.  Wynd-
ham is entitled to a very low level of statutory notice because this is a
civil statute, not criminal, and does not implicate any Constitutional
rights.255
For civil statutes regulating economic activities, “a party lacks fair
notice when the relevant standard is ‘so vague as to be no rule or
standard at all.’”256  The standard for practices that may be found
“unfair” under the FTCA is articulated by a three part test set forth in
section 45(n).257  While this standard is not precise, it does provide
notice that “the relevant inquiry here is a cost-benefit analysis.”258 An
FTC rule that expressly declares inadequate data security as an unfair
practice would foreclose such argument and removes the need to
make this determination on a case-by-case basis.
In LabMD, the ALJ similarly rejected LabMD’s contention that it
is a violation of Due Process to charge LabMD with utilizing unrea-
sonable data security without first promulgating data security stan-
dards.259  The FTC stated,
LabMD’s due process claim is particularly untenable when viewed
against the backdrop of the common law of negligence. Every day,
courts and juries subject companies to tort liability for violating un-
codified standards of care, and the contexts in which they make
those fact-specific judgments are as varied and fast-changing as the
world of commerce and technology itself.260
Although the FTC is not required to pass a TRR for every unfair
trade practice, in a new area such as data security, a TRR would pro-
vide much needed clarity and make FTC’s enforcement action more
streamlined, without prolonged battles over the extent of the FTC’s
authority.
D. Unfair Practices Under Section 45(n)
The threshold issue of FTC’s authority aside, the Commission bears
the burden of proof to show that a company’s failure to implement
reasonable and appropriate security procedures satisfies the elements
of an unfair practice.261  The three part test under section 45(n) pro-
vides that the FTC cannot declare an act or practice unfair unless: (1)
255. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 255.
256. Id. at 250 (quoting CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 632 (3d Cir.
2013)).
257. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); see supra note 100 and accompanying text. R
258. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 255.
259. In re LabMD Inc., No. 9357, 2014 FTC LEXIS 2, at *25–26 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014).
260. Id. at *47–48.
261. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 610 (D.N.J. 2014).
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“the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers”; (2) the injury is “not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves”; and (3) the harm is “not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.”262  Although the test ap-
pears broad enough to encompass inadequate data security as an un-
fair practice, establishing the elements of the test based on the facts
and circumstances of each case is not an easy task for the FTC, as
evidenced by the recent case development.  A TRR would eliminate
the need to establish each element of the test in every enforcement
action.
1. Consumer Harm
The first part of the three-part test under section 45(n) provides that
the FTC cannot declare an act or practice unfair unless “the act or
practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consum-
ers.”263  This part requires a showing of two elements: (i) substantial
injury and (ii) causation.  In cases of actual harm to consumers, it is
easy to establish both elements.  Cases involving of “likely” injury are
not precluded, but are much tougher to prove.
a. Actual Harm to Consumers
Historically, liability for unfair practices existed only in cases in-
volving actual harm to consumers.264  In the area of information secur-
ity, actual harm exists when consumers experience fraudulent charges
or identity theft following a data breach.  These harms include mone-
tary losses from fraudulent activity and identity theft as well as other
costs to remediate credit and monitor for subsequent fraudulent
activity.265
In Wyndham, the FTC sufficiently pled substantial consumer harm
because the consumers whose personal and financial information was
stolen during the three data breaches at Wyndham suffered actual
harm as a result of fraudulent charges and identity theft.  The com-
plaint alleged that approximately “619,000 consumer payment card ac-
count numbers” were compromised in the three data breaches,
resulting in “fraudulent charges on many consumers’ accounts, and
more than $10.6 million in fraud loss.”266  Cases involving actual,
quantifiable harm do not create any difficulty in establishing substan-
262. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
263. Id.
264. In re LabMD Inc., 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *114 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015).
265. Id. at *106.
266. Wyndham, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 609.
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tial harm to consumers because it easily satisfies the test for an unfair
practice.267  A problem arises when actual harm is difficult to prove or
when damages are not easily quantifiable, as was the case in LabMD.
Even if the first two elements are satisfied, failure to establish the last
element is fatal to FTC’s cause of action.
b. Likely Harm to Consumers
Cases involving potential harm absent any actual harm may not
pass the test under section 45(n) because of the ambiguity of the
phrase “likely to cause substantial injury.”268  In LabMD, the record
was devoid of any evidence of actual consumer harm resulting from
the two security incidents, so the FTC was required to prove likely
harm to consumers.269  The ALJ pointed out that the FTC could not
identify a single consumer who was actually harmed by the alleged
unreasonable conduct.270  In LabMD, the parties did not cite “any
case where unfair conduct liability has been imposed without proof of
actual harm, on the basis of predicted ‘likely’ harm alone.”271  The
FTC did not present any previous case where liability for unfair con-
duct was imposed absent proof of actual harm.272  Furthermore, the
limited number of enforcement action, all of which resulted in volun-
tary consent orders, does not give the FTC any binding precedent to
back up its allegations.273  A TRR specifically addressing information
security procedures would eliminate the need for this analysis.
The FTC stresses that language of section 45(n) does not require
actual harm and that proof of “likely” harm is sufficient.  In its com-
plaint against LabMD, the FTC presented four arguments to prove
the substantial harm requirement: (1) likely harm from identity theft
“based on an ‘increased risk’ that consumers whose information is ex-
posed in a data breach will suffer identity theft harm”; (2) likely harm
from medical identity theft “including monetary losses due to fraudu-
lently procured medical products and services”; (3) “‘[s]ignificant risk’
of reputational harm, privacy harm, and/or other harms based on
stigma or embarrassment”; and (4) “‘risk’ of harm” to consumers
whose information is on LabMD’s computer network because the net-
267. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
268. Id.
269. In re LabMD Inc., 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *112.
270. Id.
271. Id. at *114.
272. Id.
273. See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text. R
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work is at an “increased risk” of a future data breach resulting in iden-
tity theft harm, medical harm, and other harms.274
The ALJ, however, reasoned that given the length of time that had
passed since the incident and the fact that no consumer was actually
harmed since two security incidents undermines the FTC’s argument
that harm is “likely.”275  As there is no definition of “likely” within the
statute, the ALJ relied on the plain meaning, which is defined as hav-
ing a “high probability of occurring or being true.”276  Although the
FTC argued that “significant risk” of harm is sufficient to satisfy the
first prong, the ALJ reasoned that “significant risk” of harm implies a
lower threshold that “likely” harm and is thus insufficient to meet the
statutory requirement.277  The ALJ then concluded that “at best,
Complaint Counsel’s evidence of ‘risk’ shows that a future data
breach is possible, and that if such possible data breach were to occur,
it is possible that identity theft harm would result.”278
Although the FTC commissioners overturned the ALJ’s decision,
LabMD is appealing the decision, and the case is stayed pending the
appeal.279  In granting the stay, the Eleventh Circuit Court noted two
issues: (1) it is “not clear that a reasonable interpretation of § 45(n)
includes intangible harms like those that the FTC found in this case”
and (2) “it is not clear that the FTC reasonably interpreted ‘likely to
cause’ as that term is used in § 45(n).”280  The court stated that this
case presents serious legal questions, so it remains to be seen how the
Eleventh Circuit will rule.
Considering that the FTC’s success in its previous enforcement ac-
tions was based on a showing of actual harm, it seems that while a
showing of actual harm is not required by statute, it is necessary in
order to establish consumer harm.  If “likely” harm to consumers is
defined as “probable” in the manner the ALJ reasoned, this high bur-
den of proof would be fatal to many cases.  In particular, the FTC will
have difficulty pursuing companies with unreasonable data security
that has not suffered a data breach.  As the FTC realized in its admin-
istrative action against LabMD, it would be very difficult to prove that
274. In re LabMD Inc., 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *110.
275. Id. at *112–14.
276. Id. at *117 (citing Likely, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/likely (last visited Apr. 19, 2017)).
277. Id. at *120.
278. Id. at *190.
279. See In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 FTC LEXIS 128 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016), judgment
entered by No. 9357, 2016 FTC LEXIS 123 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016), stay granted, LabMD, Inc. v.
FTC, No. 16-16270-D, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23559 (11th Cir. Nov. 10, 2016).
280. LabMD, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23559, at *9–10.
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inadequate data security is likely, to “a high probability,” to lead to a
data breach.  Although this inquiry is fact intensive and depends on
the circumstances of each case, there may be too many borderline
cases which the FTC would not choose to pursue in fear of not meet-
ing the high probability standard.  The ALJ referenced the recent Sev-
enth Circuit opinion in Neiman Marcus, in which the Third Circuit
Court held that “it is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have shown a
substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus data breach.”281
The court presumed that “the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later,
to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ identities.”282
This high probability standard would effectively confine enforcement
action to incidents when there is actual harm because anything less
could fall short of the “high probability” standard.  Despite the FTC’s
attempt to distinguish unreasonable data security as an unfair practice
separate from occurrences of data breaches, in light of the LabMD
holding, this effort may be futile.
In the data security context, whether harm to consumers is “likely”
is uncertain because once their personal information is accessed, it is
purely speculative what happens to it and how consumers are harmed
unless there is actual identity theft or fraudulent charges.
c. Causation
The causation element requires a showing that unreasonable data
security was the proximate cause of consumer harm.  “Proximate
cause may be found even where the conduct of the third party is . . .
criminal, so long as the conduct was facilitated by the first party and
reasonably foreseeable, and some ultimate harm was reasonably fore-
seeable.”283  This will be of special importance in the near future be-
cause as more companies suffer data breaches, it is likely that a
consumer’s personal information is comprised though various sources.
A company could argue that the harm suffered by the consumer is not
due to their inadequate security, but rather another company that also
suffered a data breach.  Although difficult to prove, it could cast
doubt on whether a company actually caused or likely caused harm to
a consumer by failing to employ a reasonable data security policy.
Again, a TRR that clearly articulates the FTC’s authority to regulate
281. In re LabMD, Inc., 2016 FTC LEXIS 128, at *134 (quoting Remijas v. Neiman Marcus
Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015)).
282. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (“Why else would hackers break into a store’s database and
steal consumers’ private information?”).
283. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Westfarm
Assocs. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 66 F.3d 669, 688 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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inadequate data security would eliminate the need to establish each
element of an “unfair” practice.
When there is actual harm to consumers in the form In Wyndham,
the New Jersey District Court held that “FTC’s allegations also permit
the Court to reasonably infer that Hotels and Resorts’ data-security
practices caused theft of personal data, which ultimately caused sub-
stantial injury to consumers.”284  Given the severity and frequency of
the data breaches, the court noted, “[f]or good reason, Wyndham does
not argue that the cybersecurity intrusions were unforeseeable.  That
would be particularly implausible as to the second and third
attacks.”285
In LabMD, the ALJ refused to infer a connection between the Sac-
ramento Documents and any alleged information security shortfalls.
There was no evidence that the Day Sheets and checks copies found in
Sacramento “had been scanned and archived, or otherwise saved,
onto LabMD’s computer network.”286  Provided that the billing appli-
cation generating the Day Sheets does not save an electronic copy
after printing the Day Sheet and the fact that LabMD did not imple-
ment file scanning and electronic archiving until after the Sacramento
incident, it was not plausible to establish causation.287  In fact, the
FTC even “admits that ‘there is no conclusive explanation of how
LabMD Day Sheets were exposed.’”288
The fact pattern in LabMD is unique as there was no data breach of
the company network, and neither party could ascertain the source of
exposure.289  The holding on this issue should not negatively impact
future cases because this fact pattern is unique to this case and the
circumstances surrounding discovery of the Sacramento Documents
are unlikely to repeat.  A TRR would eliminate the need for this kind
of fact-intensive inquiry, much like the element that the harm was not
avoidable by the consumers.
2. Injury Not Avoidable by Consumers
The determination whether a consumer injury was reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves is fact-dependent.290  In Wynd-
ham, the court held that it cannot declare as a matter of law that con-
284. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 624 (D.N.J. 2014).
285. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 246.
286. In re LabMD Inc., No. 9357, 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *157 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015).
287. Id.
288. Id. at *160.
289. See id. at *157–60.
290. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 625 (D.N.J. 2014).
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sumers can avoid injury from payment cards.291  The court referenced
precedent and agreed that “unrebutted evidence supports a finding
that the harm suffered by consumers was not reasonably avoida-
ble.”292  In LabMD, the court did not make further inquiry into the
remaining two prongs because the FTC failed to establish the first
prong under section 45(n).293
3. Harm Is Not Outweighed by Benefits
The second prong of the test under section 45(n) is that the injury is
“not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves”294  This portion
is a cost-benefit analysis which considers the trade-offs of the prac-
tice.295  An act or practice is not unfair “unless it is injurious in its net
effects.”296
Wyndham did not present any arguments for not meeting last prong
under section 45(n).297  In LabMD, again, because the FTC provided
insufficient proof to establish the first prong under section 45(n), the
court did not make further inquiry into the remaining two prongs.298
4. Reasonable Data Security
An issue that is yet to be adjudicated on the merits is a company’s
failure to implement reasonable and appropriate data security.299  In
Wyndham, the parties settled out of court before the case was decided
on the merits.300  In LabMD, the ALJ did not need to address this
question,301 and FTC’s failure to satisfy the requirements of section
45(n) was “fatal to its case.”302  The inquiry into LabMD’s data secur-
291. Id.
292. Id. (quoting FTC v. Inc21.com, 745 F. Supp. 2d 975, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010)).
293. In re LabMD Inc., 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *192.
294. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
295. See Scott, supra note 15, at 159. R
296. Id. (quoting In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1073 (1984)).
297. See generally FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d,
799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
298. In re LabMD Inc., 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *192.
299. See Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 256 (noting that “we leave for another day whether Wynd-
ham’s alleged cybersecurity practices do in fact fail”).
300. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It Unfairly Placed
Consumers’ Payment Card Information at Risk (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-placed-consumers-payment.
301. Administrative Judge Chappell concluded that “[b]ecause the evidence fails to prove that
Respondent’s alleged unreasonable data security caused, or is likely to cause, substantial con-
sumer injury, as required by section 5(n) of the FTC[A], Respondent’s alleged unreasonable data
security cannot properly be declared an unfair act or practice in violation of section 5(a) of the
FTC[A].” In re LabMD Inc., 2015 FTC LEXIS 272, at *192-93 (emphasis added).
302. Id. at *121.  ALJ Chappell concluded that “[b]ecause the evidence fails to prove that
Respondent’s alleged unreasonable data security caused, or is likely to cause, substantial con-
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ity ended there, and LabMD’s unreasonable conduct remained refer-
enced as “alleged.”303
Furthermore, in LabMD, the ALJ stated that the FTC “referred to
negligence standards as relevant to the ‘unreasonable data security’
claim.”304  In the FTC’s order denying LabMD’s motion to dismiss,
the FTC argues that an amorphous reasonableness standard is not
unique to data security, but is actually the norm in tort liability.305
IV. IMPACT
The FTC’s current approach to data security regulation cannot ad-
dress the issue of the escalating occurrences of data breaches.  As
demonstrated in Wyndham and LabMD, FTC’s unfairness authority
can be challenged on many different grounds.306  Therefore, it is only
a matter of time before companies charged with allegedly unreasona-
ble information security challenge that standard as well.  Proving that
a company utilized unreasonable data security is the final hurdle.  So
far, the FTC has pursued companies that either lacked data security
procedures altogether or procedures in place were obviously inade-
quate, similar to Wyndham.307  In such cases, the companies could not
easily contest the FTC’s allegations and chose to settle.308  Due to the
high cost and negative publicity associated with mitigating damage
caused by a data breach, many companies implement some form of
improved information security procedures, which may or may not be
up to the FTC’s standards.309  When this occurs, the FTC will likely
face stronger opposition, as companies will have grounds to challenge
their compliance with the amorphous reasonableness standard.
sumer injury, as required by section 5(n) of the FTC[A], Respondent’s alleged unreasonable data
security cannot properly be declared an unfair act or practice in violation of section 5(a) of the
FTC[A].” Id. at *192–93 (emphasis added).  Similarly, the Administrative Judge did not address
the second and third prongs of the three-part test under section 45(n). Id.
303. Id.  The Administrative Judge also enclosed the word “reasonable” in quotation marks
when referring to “reasonable” security. Id. at *100 (“Respondent failed to provide ‘reasonable’
security for Personal Information on its computer networks.”).
304. Id. at *185 n. 44.
305. In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2014 LEXIS 2, at *47–48 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014) (arguing
that “courts and juries subject companies to tort liability for violating uncodified standards of
care, and the contexts in which they make those fact-specific judgments are as varied and fast-
changing as the world of commerce and technology itself”).
306. See supra notes 115-71 and accompanying text. R
307. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 799
F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
308. DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28. R
309. Robert O. Carr, Small to Mid Size Businesses: The New Target for Hackers, HEARTLAND
BLOG (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.heartlandpaymentsystems.com/blog/2015/02/23/small-to-mid-
size-businesses-the-new-target-for-hackers.
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FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez issued the following statement
following the Wyndham decision:
Today’s Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision reaffirms the
FTC’s authority to hold companies accountable for failing to safe-
guard consumer data.  It is not only appropriate, but critical, that
the FTC has the ability to take action on behalf of consumers when
companies fail to take reasonable steps to secure sensitive consumer
information.310
The Chairwoman’s statement conveys the FTC’s goal to pursue
companies that fail to implement a reasonable security program.
FTC’s resistance to promulgating a TRR is inconsistent with this
goal.311  As demonstrated by Wyndham and LabMD, pursuing com-
panies under section 45(a) requires the FTC to establish all the ele-
ments of an unfair practice while addressing challenges to its authority
to bring an unfairness claim in the data security context.  The FTC can
avoid the uncertain and drawn out proceedings by passing a TRR that
specifically proclaims inadequate data security as an unfair practice
and prescribes the security measures that could be part of a reasona-
ble security program.  Prescribing the standards for security is no
longer as daunting because the FTC has already articulated these
standards in its consent orders and guidebooks.
Although the FTC has been hesitant to issue a TRR in fear of it
being too limiting in scope,312 the current approach will harm the
FTC’s ability to successfully bring actions in the future.  A TRR is
specific in nature, so any form of articulated standard for a reasonable
data security means it could quickly become outdated.  There are,
however, certain basic preventive measures that every company
should employ in order to safeguard consumer information.  When
the methods prescribed in the TRR become outdated or inadequate,
the FTC can issue an amendment or a supplement to align the stan-
dard with industry best practices at that time.
By refusing to promulgate TRRs that would apply to the commer-
cial sector generally, the FTC is severely limiting its authority to regu-
late commercial data security, which conflicts with its own mission
statement.  The FTC proclaimed its mission is to “prevent business
310. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement from FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez on
Appellate Ruling in the Wyndham Hotels and Resorts Matter (Aug. 24, 2015), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/08/statement-ftc-chairwoman-edith-ramirez-appel
late-ruling-wyndham.
311. However, “[i]t is not surprising that administrative agencies generally prefer broader and
more discretionary standards to the strictures that defined rules impose.”  J. Howard Beales, III,
Brightening the Lines: The Use of Policy Statements at the Federal Trade Commission, 72 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 1057, 1059 (2005).
312. See Hans, supra note 204, at 173. R
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practices that are anticompetitive or deceptive or unfair to consumers
. . . without unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”313  Adjudi-
cating on a case-by-case basis is not an efficient way for the FTC to
protect consumers from harm due to inadequate information security.
If the goal is to prevent harm before it occurs, a dozen enforcement
actions every year is not the way to achieve that goal.  With a few
exceptions, once a company experiences a data breach, it takes steps
to improve its information security procedures.314  In response to the
escalating instances of data breaches, the business sector will eventu-
ally self-regulate until businesses employ some form of a data security
program.315  At that point, however, the damage will already be done.
Until recently, the targets were major retailers and large financial
institutions where hackers could gain access to a large volume of data
in one attack.316  The companies naturally responded by promptly im-
proving security practices because larger companies have available re-
sources to overhaul their information security practices.  This change
in the larger corporations is expected because their breaches are
highly publicized, and the company needs to salvage its reputation and
retain customers.  As larger companies employed better security prac-
tices, hackers shifted focus to smaller companies, which are not as well
protected and thus more vulnerable.317  In its 2014 Year-End Eco-
nomic Report, the National Small Business Association “found that
half of all small businesses report they have been the victim of a
cyber-attack.”318  The FTC recognized this trend and issued guide-
books and suggested best practices tailored to small and medium sized
companies, which may not have an IT department to determine the
sufficient security measures.319  Hackers have shifted focus to smaller
companies because although they obtain fewer records per hack, the
security system may not be as advanced.  The FTC must utilize a
broad enforcement approach to counter the prevalent threat of data
breaches.
Since the FTC became involved in the regulation of data security
practices in 2002, the criticism was the lack of relevant guidelines and
313. About the FTC, supra note 29. R
314. DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28. R
315. Carr, supra note 309. R
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. NAT’L SMALL BUS. ASS’N, 2014 YEAR-END ECONOMIC REPORT 2 (2015), http://
www.nsba.biz/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Year-End-Economic-Report-2014.pdf.  The 2014
Year-End Economic Report was among 675 small business owners across every industry in every
state in the nation. Id.
319. Data Security, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/
data-security (last visited Apr. 19, 2017).
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suggested practices that left companies in the dark about what they
are required to comply with.320  In response to this critique, the FTC
has released numerous guides that recommend best practices for busi-
ness.321  Though well intentioned and necessary—these guides do shed
some light on what the FTC expects—the necessary security standard
is still vague.322  The FTC casts a wide net and suggests different prac-
tices that may contribute to reasonable security.323  Businesses are left
to reconcile all of these sources and come up with a “reasonable”
combination.324  The guides can be consolidated to serve as founda-
tion for a TRR, which may prescribe the particular means by which
companies can avoid committing unfair acts.325  The FTC has already
dedicated so much effort to research, enforcement, and education
about reasonable information security practices, so it has the neces-
sary resources to pass a TRR.326
V. CONCLUSION
As technology develops and people utilize more internet connected
devices, the volume of generated data continues to climb to unprece-
dented levels.  As more data is being generated, more personal and
financial information is collected and stored by entities across differ-
ent industries.  Individuals generally have no control over where or
how their personal information is stored; therefore, it is up to the gov-
ernment to act on behalf of the people to protect their personal infor-
mation.  In the area of commerce, the FTC has taken a leading role to
protect consumers from substantial injury due to unfair and deceptive
data security practices.  The effort, while much needed, is becoming
futile in light of the escalating data breaches.
The FTC must reconsider its enforcement to devise a more efficient,
broader approach, which can be made possible by promulgating
TRRs.  The FTC has been reluctant to pass TRRs in fear of the rules
being too limiting and becoming obsolete as technology rapidly
evolves.  While it is unlikely the FTC will change its enforcement ap-
proach in the near future, as data breaches continue, perhaps it will
see the urgency in reconsidering its position.  Despite cumbersome
320. Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 30, at 691. R
321. Data Security, supra note 319. R
322. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. R
323. Data Security, supra note 319. R
324. Id.
325. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a).
326. See DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 28.  The FTC has invested in public education R
and has “hosted over 35 workshops, town halls, and roundtables bringing together stakeholders
to discuss emerging issues in consumer privacy and security” beginning in 1996. Id.
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procedure, the FTC should utilize its authority to promulgate TRRs
to regulate inadequate data security programs as an unfair practice.
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